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Abstract

The Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineering Requirements (SABER)
contract's main purpose is to expedite contract award of civil engineer requirements
through the issuance of individual delivery orders. The contract contains a collection of
detailed task specifications that include most types of real property maintenance, repair,
and construction work.
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition's Operational
Contracting Division (SAF/AQCO) identified a number of failed SABER contracts. The
problem statement designed for this research effort was:
There are a large number of SABER contractors that are failing during the
performance period on their SABER contracts. SAF/AQCO is trying to
identify whether any Government actions or procedures are negatively
impacting the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the SABER
contract.
This research effort focused on five areas within the SABER process that is
controlled by the Government. A qualitative approach using case study analysis was
used. Seven SABER contracts were selected as case studies.
The research did not identify any Air Force-wide procedures in the five areas that
negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract.
The research identified two areas of potential follow-on research.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS FOR SIMPLIFIED
ACQUISITION OF BASE ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS (SABER)
CONTRACTS AND ITS
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE

/. Introduction
The Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix
DD defines a Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineering Requirements (SABER)
contract as a fixed-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract that
contains provisions for economic price adjustments. Containing a collection of detailed
task specifications, a SABER contract includes most types of real property maintenance,
repair, and construction work (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-102).
A SABER contract's main purpose is to expedite contract award of civil engineer
requirements through the issuance of individual delivery orders (DO). A SABER
program achieves this purpose through a reduction in the acquisition lead time and civil
engineering design work (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-103(a)).
There are six benefits of a successfully run SABER program. Two primary
benefits are identified in AFFARS Appendix DD. The first benefit is that the
Government obtains improved customer service and responsiveness. The acquisition
lead-time for issuance of a DO is approximately three to four weeks (AFFARS DD,
2000:DD-103(b)(l)). This is compared to traditional construction acquisition methods
that have a normal acquisition lead time of at least 60 days.

The second benefit is that the Government motivates the contractor to produce
high quality work in a timely manner (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 103(b)(2)).
As an IDIQ contract, a SABER contract provides the Government with the
majority of control as to the amount of work the contractor will be awarded. SABER
contracts include a stated minimum and maximum dollar amount that the Government
can award to the contractor. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 16.504(a)(2)
identifies that the minimum amount awarded must be greater than a nominal amount, but
should not exceed the amount that the Government is fairly certain to award. When
determining the stated maximum amount, FAR 16.504(a)(1) provides that the
Government's contracting officer should establish a reasonable maximum amount based
on a number of factors. These factors include market research, trends for similar work,
and a survey of potential demand within the using community (FAR, 2000:16.504).
Often, the difference between the minimum and maximum dollar amount is large. For
example, a number of the SABER contracts studied contained a stated minimum amount
of $200,000 with a stated maximum amount of $5,000,000 over the 5-year contract
period.
One way that the Government motivates the SABER contractor is through the
Government's authority to award DOs above the stated minimum dollar amount. If the
contractor is producing high quality work in a timely manner, the Government will
continue awarding work until the contract performance period ends or the contract
maximum dollar amount is reached. If the contractor is not performing satisfactorily, the
Government is under no obligation to award work above the stated minimum dollar
amount. At that point, the Government has the ability to use traditional construction

contracting methods to satisfy future requirements until the existing SABER contract's
period of performance ends. The Government then reserves the right not to exercise any
available option to the current SABER contract and is free to reprocure the requirement
through a new source selection process. Theoretically, the second benefit of a successful
SABER program results from the potential for the contractor to lose work above the
stated minimum dollar amount, which acts as a motivator for the contractor to provide
top quality work in a timely manner (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-103).
Recently, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition's Operational
Contracting Division (SAF/AQCO) identified a number of installations that are having
problems with its SABER contractors. Some contractors have gone out of business and
defaulted on their contracts. Other contractors have not lived up to the performance
standards identified in the SABER contract. In these situations, the Government decided
not to exercise the next option on the existing SABER contract.
As in the commercial world, a failed contract with the Government negatively
impacts both the buyer-the Government does not get what it needs-and the seller—the
contractor loses revenue and risks financial instability. Since it is not the intent of the
Government to place a contractor in financial distress, the aforementioned problems
relating to SABER contracts have led to concern within SAF/AQCO on whether the Air
Force's acquisition strategy is creating an environment that leads these contractors to
failure. This concern led to the following problem statement.

Problem Statement
There are a large number of SABER contractors that are failing during the
performance period on their SABER contracts. SAF/AQCO is trying to identify
whether any Government actions or procedures are negatively impacting the
contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the SABER contract.
For the purpose of this research, contractor failure is defined by two outcomes.
First, a SABER contractor defaults on its contract during the period of performance.
Typically, the contractor either goes out of business or decides to no longer perform work
on the existing contract. This results in the Government exercising its right to terminate
the contractor for default.
The second failure outcome results from poor performance by the contractor
during the period of performance. The poor performance leads to a Government decision
to not exercise an existing option on the SABER contract.

Research Question and Subsidiary Research Questions
The main research question developed for this thesis is:
Are there any Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process
that is leading to contractor failure during the contract's period of performance?
In addition to the main research question, a number of subsidiary research
questions were developed that were potential factors in contributing to contractor failure.
These areas were specifically identified for research analysis from the case studies to
determine whether they were contributory factors in contract failure, where applicable.
These subsidiary questions are:
(1) What was the Government's method of pricing the SABER contract? Did
this pricing method negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily
perform?

(2) What role, if applicable, did liquidated damages have during the performance
of the SABER contract? Did the assessment of liquidated damages, when
applied, negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on
existing and future SABER DOs?
(3) Does the Government reimburse the contractor for the cost of preparing a
proposal for a project that is eventually not executed? If not, did this practice
negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract?
(4) How does the Government balance the issuance of SABER delivery orders
over the course of the contract period? Were there any surges, particularly in the
fiscal year 4th quarter, which negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability
to satisfactorily perform?
(5) Was there any inappropriate use of the SABER contract? If so, did this
negatively impact the SABER contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform?

Research Objective
The objective of this research effort was to identify and analyze any conditions
that may have been created by the current acquisition strategy and lead to SABER
contractor failures.
Prior to conducting the research, there were no specific anticipated results.
Preliminary inquiries determined that there were a number of failed SABER contracts
throughout the Air Force. Each SABER contract failure represented that installation's
unique situation. There was limited information to specifically identify whether any
aspect of the Government's acquisition process, as a whole, was responsible for the failed
contracts. Therefore, this research was geared to determine whether there is an overall
problem with the current process.

Research Methodology
A qualitative approach was used for conducting the research. Case study analysis
was determined as an effective method of research. Interviews and the compilation of
case study documents were used for research data collection. A number of Air Force
bases were identified where a SABER contractor has either defaulted or will not be
renewed for the next option period. Interview subjects included base contracting and
civil engineering personnel. Primarily for legal reasons, SABER contractors were not
interviewed during this research effort. Chapter III, Limitations of the Research, fully
addresses the rationale behind this decision.
The purpose of collecting this data was to identify similarities or trends in the
numerous contractor failures and to determine if they are related to conditions resulting
from Government actions in the acquisition process.
Information was gathered to identify the processes and procedures used during the
source selection process, the contract award process, and the contract performance. The
specific area of focus was on any circumstances that led to contractor failure on the
contract. The details and specifics of the data collection process is presented in
Chapter III, Methodology.

Scope of Research
The main research question encompasses all of the aspects of the SABER
acquisition process. The subsidiary questions included specific areas that were identified
as potential problematic areas to analyze. These questions were developed prior to the
collection of the data for this research.

The Research Objective section identified that there were no specific anticipated
results. Therefore, the scope of the research encompassed the entire SABER acquisition
process while it focused on five specific areas of interest.

Relevance of the Research
This research provided empirical data that directly impacts two communities
within the Air Force. These two areas are SAF/AQCO and the Air Force Institute of
Technology's Civil Engineering and Services School's Department of Engineering
Management (AFIT/CEM).
The research will be used by SAF/AQCO in two ways. The research will aid
SAF/AQCO in the rewrite of AFFARS Appendix DD. This rewrite will directly impact
the procedures and processes used by each Air Force operational contracting squadron
that utilizes the SABER contract.
Furthermore, the research will also be used by SAF/AQCO for the rewrite of the
SABER Guide, which was last published in 1992. The new SABER guide will be written
in conjunction with the Air Force Logistics Management Agency, who co-authored the
SABER Guide written in 1992.
AFIT/CEM will also use this research in two ways. Primarily, the research will
help validate the program's course material for its SABER course offered to all
organizations that utilize or intend on utilizing a SABER contract. Participants in past
courses included government contracting and civil engineer personnel, as well as SABER
contractors. In addition, the empirical data will provide field feedback on the SABER
program, to include the successes and opportunities for improvement within the SABER

community. This information can be used to survey the using community to identify best
practices and lessons learned in the SABER program.

Summary
Chapter I provided an introduction to the research topic related to this thesis
effort. The chapter provided a definition of a SABER contract followed by the purpose
and the benefits of a SABER contract. In addition, this chapter introduced the problem
statement and the research questions on which the research focused. The objective of the
research was also covered. Chapter I also provided a brief introduction to the
methodology used for the research effort. Chapter I concluded with the scope and the
relevance of the research.
Chapter II, Literature Review, will provide the specifics of the SABER contract
and the SABER acquisition process that is presented in the current literature. Chapter III,
Methodology, will break down the methods and applicable tools that were used in
collecting the necessary data to meet the research objective. Chapter IV, Analysis, will
provide the data and information gathered during the interviews and installation visits.
Finally, Chapter V, Results and Conclusions, will provide the results from the research as
well as any conclusions that can be made from the research data collected.

II. Literature Review

Chapter II synopsizes recent literature available on the Air Force's SABER
program. The first part of this chapter focuses on the indefinite-delivery, indefinitequantity (IDIQ) contracts. The second part covers acquisition planning involved with
Government acquisitions, specifically SABER acquisitions. The third and final part of
the chapter provides the specifics of the SABER program.
There is a limited amount of literature available specific to the Air Force's
SABER program. Literature regarding Government acquisitions in general was found in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The primary literature on SABER includes the Air
Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix DD and the
SABER Guide, published in 1992 by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency and
the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency.

Indefinite-Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contracts
As stated in Chapter I, the contract instrument used by the SABER contract is a
fixed-price indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) Subpart 16.5, Indefinite-Delivery Contracts, provides the guidance for
making awards of indefinite-delivery contracts.
The use of IDIQ contracts is appropriate when the Government cannot
predetermine the quantities or delivery times of recurring requirements for services or
supplies during the contract period (FAR, 2000:16.504(b)).

The Government is required to provide a stated minimum and maximum quantity,
in dollar values or number of units, in each IDIQ contract. SABER contracts state dollar
values since each requirement is unique under the contract (FAR, 2000:16.504(a)).
The contracting officer must ensure the stated minimum quantity is "more than a
nominal quantity, but it should not exceed the amount that the Government is fairly
certain to order" (FAR, 2000:16.504(a)(2)).

Acquisition Planning
FAR Subpart 7.1, Acquisition Plans, defines acquisition planning as "the process
by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and
integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely
manner and at a reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall strategy for managing
the acquisition" (FAR, 2000:7.101).
Like the head coach of a National Football League team going to the Super Bowl,
the Government wants to enter into its acquisition procurements with a strong game plan.
The acquisition plan is just the vehicle the Government team needs for this purpose.
FAR 7.102(a) requires each agency to perform acquisition planning for all acquisitions.
FAR Subpart 7 prescribes the policies and procedures for acquisition planning for
all Government procurements. In addition to this guidance, AFFARS DD-203, SABER
Acquisition Strategy, identifies specific efforts the Government should make in SABER
procurements.
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SABER Acquisition Strategy and Plan Development
AFFARS Appendix DD Part 2 covers the SABER acquisition planning and
source selection process.

Establishment of a SABER Working Group
The initial step in the SABER acquisition process is to establish a SABER
working group. The working group should consist of the SABER personnel from the
contracting and civil engineering squadrons. The group should be led by the CE SABER
Chief or the base civil engineer (BCE) and the contracting officer should be an assistant
on the group. Initial tasks should involve estimating the expected scope of the SABER
program for the base, attempting to obtain up-front funding and projected budget
requirements from associate organizations, and deciding on the best organizational
structure for the SABER unit, to include the number of personnel assigned to the team
(AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-201). The working group's efforts lead to the SABER
Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP).

SABER Acquisition Strategy Panel and Acquisition Plan
AFFARS Appendix DD-203 requires the contracting officer to convene an ASP at
the earliest practical point in the SABER acquisition process. The primary objective of
the ASP is to ensure the government establishes an effective approach to the SABER
acquisition process (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-203(a)).
Big picture considerations in preparing for the ASP include the acquisition
background and program objectives for the base's SABER program, the anticipated

SABER requirements and program value, applicable contractual specifications, and
pricing methodology (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-203(c)).
In addition, AFFARS DD-203(d) prescribes 10 specific areas to include:
- The anticipated sources for the SABER requirement,
- Competition issues such as the need to enhance competition as well as the use
of streamline source selection procedures identified in acquisition reform
initiatives,
- Unique contracting considerations regarding the requirement,
- Funding and budgeting issues,
- Management information considerations,
- The use of Government-furnished property on the contract,
- Environmental issues,
-Security issues,
- Milestones for the SABER acquisition cycle, and
- Identification of personnel for the SABER acquisition process.
A product from the ASP process is the Acquisition Plan. The Acquisition Plan is
the roadmap for the SABER source selection process. Elements of the Acquisition Plan
include the SABER acquisition's background, the acquisition objectives, a plan of action
or game plan for the source selection process, and a list of milestones for the source
selection (FAR, 2000:7.105).
Following these activities, the BCE is responsible for preparing the SABER
program specifications. AFFARS Appendix DD-202 provides the specifics that should
be included in this part of the process.
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In addition to this process, the BCE prepares the unit price book (UPB), which is
described below. The UPB must be localized to reflect the costs of various task
specifications within the base's region. The accomplishment of the UPB is vital in the
acquisition process since the UPB is included in the SABER Request for Proposal and
will be the basis for the offerer's proposed coefficients and eventual contract pricing
(AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-202(b)).

SABER Request for Proposal
The SABER Request for Proposal is the official document sent out by the SABER
contracting officer to potential bidders interested in submitting proposals for award of the
SABER contract.
AFFARS Appendix DD-205 lists the specific information that should be included
in the SABER Request for Proposal.
SABER Source Selection Procedures
Air Force Acquisition Circular 96-2 eliminated AFFARS Appendix BB, Source
Selection Procedures For Other Than Major Acquisitions, which was the guidance for
source selection procedures for SABER acquisitions.
In lieu of this change, FAR 36.103, Methods of Contracting, establish the criteria
that should be used in conducting SABER source selections. In referencing FAR
6.401(a), FAR 36.103 sets the use of sealed bidding as the preferred method of
contracting. However, FAR 6.401(b) establishes the exceptions that allow the
contracting officer to use the competitive proposal process, which allow negotiations.

The procedures for sealed bid procurements are covered in FAR Part 14. The
competitive proposal procedures are covered in FAR Part 15.

SABER Contracts
The SABER contact is a fixed-price indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity
(IDIQ) contract that may contain provisions for economic price adjustments during the
term of the contract. Each SABER contract contains a set of detailed task specifications
that cover most types of real property maintenance, repair, and construction work.
SABER contracts are normally awarded for one year and can contain a maximum of four
option years that may be subsequently awarded (AFFARS, 2000: DD-102). The
following sections will review the history of the SABER contract, as well as describe the
purpose and benefits of the SABER contract. This section will conclude with an
overview of the SABER delivery order process.

SABER History
The SABER contract was first used in January 1987 at McClellan Air Force Base,
California. The SABER program was modeled after the Army and Navy's Job Order
Contracting (JOC) program. JOC was developed and implemented in an effort to
overcome a number of problems including the performance quality and responsiveness of
the contractor. Following a brief test period at McClellan, SABER contracts were
authorized for use Air Force-wide (SABER Guide, 1992:1).
The SABER program was developed to complement traditional construction
contracting methods. A SABER contract is designed to expedite contract award of Civil
Engineer (CE) requirements relating to the procurement of most types of real property
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maintenance, repair, and construction work (SABER Guide, 1992:4). Under traditional
construction contracting methods, individual requirements identified would be procured
through a competitive source selection process that required a minimum of 60 days.
Since its inception, the SABER contract has grown to be an effective contract
tool. In data collected by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition's
Operational Contracting Division (SAF/AQCO) in July 1999, 79 of 85 bases reported
having a SABER contract in place. Three of the six bases without SABER contracts
were part of the Air Force Reserve.

Purpose of SABER
AFFARS Appendix DD-103(a) states "The purpose of the Air Force SABER
program is to expedite contract award of civil engineer requirements by reducing civil
engineer design work and acquisition lead time. SABER is best suited for non-complex,
minor construction and maintenance and repair projects that require minimum design."

Benefits of SABER
There are six benefits that have been identified with successful SABER programs.
AFFARS Appendix DD and the SABER Guide, developed by the Air Force Logistics
Management Center and the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency, address these
benefits.
The first benefit is that the SABER program improves customer service and
responsiveness. A SABER DO can typically be awarded within four weeks of the
submission of work request by the Base Civil Engineer (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD103(b)(1)). At Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the average acquisition lead-time, during
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the period from January 1998 - July 1999, was less than 11 days for DO award. In lieu
of traditional construction contracting methods, which normally requires a minimum of
60 days to award, SABER DOs provide the customer with rapid service.
A second benefit inherent in a successful SABER program is that the contractor
will be motivated to perform high quality work in a timely manner. The SABER
contractor is guaranteed a certain minimum dollar amount each year the contract is in
place. Once this minimum dollar amount is reached, the Government is not required to
use the SABER contract during that period of performance. Therefore, the contractor
risks losing additional business if it does not perform high quality work during the
contract's period of performance (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-103(b)(2). Poor performance
also places the contractor at risk of not being renewed for any applicable contract options
on the existing SABER contract.
The third benefit is the potential synergy that will be obtained between the base
contracting office, the civil engineering office, and the contractor. When all three parties
are team-oriented and maintain an open line of communication, the SABER program will
be very effective (SABER Guide, 1992:5). This type of environment was established on
the SABER program at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The three parties formally met
once per week to review all open delivery orders, discuss any past discrepancies, and
forecast upcoming projects that were awaiting funds.
A fourth benefit of SABER is the ability to accomplish backlogged work orders
and high-level requirements that require immediate action (SABER Guide, 1992:5).
SABER can easily accommodate the high-level projects, such as refurbishing the new

base commander's office, without interrupting in-service work or overextending the
existing workforce.
The fifth benefit is that a successful SABER program provides the BCE with
additional resources to accomplish CEs mission (SABER Guide, 1992:5). This benefit
has especially been realized since the force reduction experienced throughout the 1990s.
With the downsized environment, base civil engineering squadrons do not have the
manpower to accommodate much of the minor construction work it once could handle.
Furthermore, other situations, like deployments and training, directly affect the mission
capability of every military unit. SABER provides the BCE with an effective tool to
manage the overall workload in the civil engineer community.
The sixth benefit is that the customer (the using organization) has added fiscal
flexibility (SABER Guide, 1992:5). If a work order, that is SABER eligible is placed on
a backlog within civil engineering, organizations have the option to fund the project with
its organizational funds. This provides the organizations with the ability to obtain quality
work in a responsive, timely fashion.

SABER Delivery Order (DO) Program
The execution of SABER contracts is accomplished through the issuance of
individual delivery orders (DOs). The DO is the formal contractual instrument that
orders the contractor to perform work under the SABER contract. The contracting officer
issues SABER DOs once negotiations are completed for the specific work covered in the
Government's request for proposal.
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SABER Execution and Administration
This section provides an overview of the program execution and contract
administration of the SABER process. The step-by-step process for SABER is detailed in
AFFARS Appendix DD Part 3.

Pre-issuance of a Delivery Order
Once the customer identifies a requirement to CE, CE completes a preliminary
planning estimate that is then submitted with a statement of work and other required
documentation to the SABER element within the contracting squadron (AFFARS DD,
2000:DD-301(a)). The SABER contracting element then issues a request for proposal to
the contractor on the SABER contract (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(c)).
Prior to the submission of proposals, a site visit is conducted to allow the
contractor access to the work area. During the site visit, the contractor, CE project
manager, contracting officer, and customer will review the requirements of the work to
be accomplished. Specific items that will be covered during the site visit include the
method and time requirement for accomplishing the work (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD301(b)). Once the site visit is accomplished, the contractor develops and submits a cost
proposal for the work.
Upon receipt of a proposal, the contracting officer and the assigned contract
administrator review the proposal for completeness, compliance, scope, and
reasonableness. The contracting officer then requests a technical evaluation of the
proposal from the CE SABER office (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(d)(l)).

If the proposal is technically acceptable, the contract administrator will then
review the proposal's pricing structure to ensure compliance to the contract's pricing
book (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(d)(2)). Prices not included in the book, known as
non-priced items (NPI), must be negotiated prior to DO award. Each NPI must be within
the general scope of the contract (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301 (d)(2)).
If the proposal is not acceptable, the SABER contracting officer may opt to return
the proposal for rework or send the original work request package back to the Base Civil
Engineer to determine if the project should be postponed, cancelled, or completed by
another method (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301(d)(3)).
The contracting officer, CE SABER technical representative, and the contractor
then negotiate any differences between the contractor's proposal and the government's
position on the work to be performed. Once all issues are resolved, the contracting officer
must prepare a price negotiation memorandum (PNM) that covers specific areas relating
to the project (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-301 (d)(4)). AFFARS Appendix DD-301(4)(i-iii)
provides the necessary information that must be included in the PNM.

Issuance of the Delivery Order
Following the completion of the PNM and all other required documentation, the
contracting officer issues a delivery order for the work. The DO is the legal authority
from the contracting officer to obligate the government to the work identified in the DOs
statement of work. The DO should include the statement of work, any applicable
drawings, and a notice to proceed (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-302(a)).

Modifications to a Delivery Order
If, during the course of performance, a legitimate change in work is identified, the
DO may be modified. Potential changes in work, such as differing site conditions, must
be within the scope of the original DO. The process of issuing a modification is the same
as that of issuing a delivery order (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-302(b)).

Inspection and Acceptance of Work Completed on a Delivery Order
In order to ensure satisfactory contractor performance of each delivery order, the
SABER contracting and SABER CE elements are responsible for a number of actions.
In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.236-1, Performance
of Work by the Contractor, the contracting officer and administrator are required to
monitor contractual requirements including the percentage of direct work completed on
the DO.
The SABER CE program manager ensures quality assurance inspections are
performed during the performance period on the DO. Once work is accomplished on the
DO, the SABER CE program manager, contracting officer and/or administrator,
contractor, and customer perform a final inspection on the work performed (AFFARS
DD, 2000:DD-303). If the performance meets DO requirements, the Government accepts
the work and begins the closeout process (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-303(c)). If the work
is unsatisfactory, the Government must determine whether the areas of unacceptable
performance are minor or major. If the discrepancies are minor, the Government can still
accept the work. A document, called the punch-list, is created that identifies the minor
discrepancies and establishes a deadline for the contractor to correct them. If the
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discrepancies are deemed major, the work is not acceptable. In this situation, the
contractor must correct the work identified as unacceptable. If the period of performance
deadline has been reached, the Government has the ability to assess liquidated damages
on the DO.

SABER Contract Terms and Options
As previously stated, SABER contracts are usually awarded for 12 months and
may contain a maximum of four option years on the contract. AFFARS Appendix DD401 identifies the need for the contracting officer to balance the benefits of increased
administrative efficiency in exercising SABER contract options and the positive
performance incentive offered to the current SABER contractor against the added
economic and market risks that are inherent in extending the contract term. The
regulation suggests that three option years offer the optimum balance.
SABER contracts must also contain provisions for making yearly adjustments to
the option prices listed on the SABER contract. These adjustments can be accomplished
through two avenues. The first is through the issuance of an updated price book that is
localized to reflect the current market conditions within the area. The alternative is
through the use of an economic price adjustment (EPA) clause. The EPA clause includes
the criteria and predetermined formulas to update the coefficients on the SABER contract
(AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-402).

SABER DO Pricing
Prices on delivery orders are established using the SABER contract's price book
and the applicable coefficient for the contract line item listed in the SABER contract.

21

Price books contain a majority of the standard work tasks associated with construction.
Standard unit prices are listed with each work task. The listed price is multiplied by the
coefficient to obtain a total for the specific DO task. Each contract line item is totaled to
arrive at the total cost for the DO.
There are traditionally two types of price books used on SABER contracts. The
first is a Government-generated Unit Price Book (UPB). The second is a commercially
available price book. This research identified that the most commonly used commercial
price book is published by R.S. Means, headquartered in Kingston, MA.

Unit Price Book
The Base Civil Engineer prepares the Unit Price Book (UPB) for inclusion with
the SABER Request for Proposal during the source selection process. The UPB is a list
of task specifications unique to the type of work within the contract. Each task
specification lists a standard unit of measure and standard unit price. For example, a task
specification may be a specific grade of road paving with a standard unit of measure by
the square foot with a standard unit price of $25 per square foot. The UPB is localized
for each SABER contract. Localization involves tailoring the UPB task specification
information to the specific location of the base the SABER contract is awarded (AFFARS
DD, 2000:DD-102 (1); DD-202). An example of localization would be an adjustment to
a line item based on the prevailing wage rate for the particular task, e.g. plumbing, for
that area.
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Creating or modifying a UPB is a time-intensive task. There are tens of
thousands of line items contained in a UPB. For this reason, many bases are opting to
use a commercially available price book for the contract.

R.S. Means
Many Air Force bases have turned to the R.S. Means price book for its SABER
contract. R.S. Means publishes an annual price book that contains most of the line items
typically identified in construction efforts. The list prices identify the average cost found
throughout the United States. Another section of the price book provides locality
adjustment factors for a large number of cities throughout the country.
When pricing a SABER DO using the R.S. Means price book, the applicable line
item is taken from the R.S. Means catalog and multiplied by the catalog's locality
adjustment factor that corresponds to the base's region. This figure is then multiplied by
the SABER contractor's coefficient to obtain a total cost for that line item.

Coefficients
Coefficients are factors that are multiplied by the price book's standard unit prices
and result in a cost for the task specification identified in individual DOs. Coefficients
are calculated and included by the contractor in its initial proposal during the source
selection process. The contractor considers various internal costs, such as overhead,
profit, and general and administrative expenses, in determining its proposed coefficients.
The number of coefficients is developed based on the amount of contract line items in the
request for proposal. SABER contracts typically include line items for standard and non-

23

Standard labor hours, or unique work environments, such as secured areas or isolated site
work.
A coefficient of 1.0 indicates that the contractor is performing the contract at the
exact costs identified within the applicable price book. AFFARS Appendix DD presents
a case that the offerer's proposed coefficients reflect its perception on the accuracy of the
price book used on the SABER contract. For example, if the contractor believes the UPB
prices are consistently lower than the prices actually found in the local area, the
contractor will bid high coefficients in its proposal. AFFARS Appendix DD argues that
unbalanced UPBs increase the uncertainty for the contractor in preparing its proposal,
which increases the possibility of inequitable pricing of SABER contracts. This fact
stresses the importance of the localization process in developing the UPB.

Liquidated Damages
FAR 11.502 establishes the policy on determining when liquidated damages
clauses should be included in Government contracts. Liquidated damages are normally
included on SABER contracts. Liquidated damages are applied to individual DOs versus
the total contract. The SABER contracting officer should assess the need for liquidated
damages for each delivery order. Areas for consideration should include the total number
of DOs outstanding and the contractor's ability to control project milestones (AFFARS
DD, 2000:DD-306(b)).
If the contractor exceeds the deadline on the period of performance on a DO that
contains liquidated damages, the contracting officer assesses liquidated damages on the
delivery order until the project is completed.
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Project Estimating Fees
Some SABER contracts include a contract line item, which reimburses the
contractor for Government-requested proposals, or project estimations, for potential
SABER work that is eventually not executed.
The Government normally uses this line item towards the end of the fiscal year.
In preparation for end of year fall-out money, a number of potential SABER projects will
be identified and the Government will request a project estimate for the work. If the
project is not funded within a specified amount of time, the contractor is paid for the cost
of preparing the estimate, which is identified in the contract. If the project is funded, the
cost for the preparation is absorbed in the total cost of the delivery order.

Balanced Workload
Due to the nature of Government spending, SABER programs and contracts often
experience a fiscal year 4th quarter surge in use. This period occurs during the months of
July through September. It is essential for the Government to ensure the SABER
contractor understands this situation and is prepared for such occurrences.
An unprepared contractor could be overwhelmed with the amount of work that is
awarded during this time frame. An effective SABER contractor must have the
capability to expand and contract its work force to meet such demands. Government
SABER personnel should also communicate to the contractor any anticipated surges due
to upcoming events.
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Inappropriate Use
There are a number of limitations placed on the issuance of SABER DOs.
SABER contracts should be used as a complement, not a replacement, to traditional
construction methods. Specifically, SABER is not an appropriate tool for procuring
large, complex construction projects that normally require extensive design efforts. In
addition, SABER is not appropriate for predominantly single skill/material projects
where other contractual vehicles may be more cost effective (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD104(a)).
There is a monetary limit of $500,000 that a SABER DO cannot exceed without a
waiver signed by the base commander. This limitation includes any proposed
modification to an existing DO. Therefore, the total sum of the delivery order and the
proposed modification cannot exceed $500,000. In either case, the waiver must be
approved by the base commander prior to the award of the DO or modification.
AFFARS Appendix DD-104(c)(l-3) provides the specific information that must be
included in a waiver package (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-104(c)).
There are also limitations placed on Architect-engineer (A-E) services and nonpersonal services. SABER contracts may not be used on most projects that were
designed using A-E services (AFFARS DD-104(b)). AFFARS Appendix DD104(b)(2)(i-ii) lists the exceptions to this rule.
SABER is inappropriate for work that is subject to the provisions of the Service
Contract Act. The Department of Labor has the jurisdiction over whether a particular
requirement is construction work, therefore subject to the Davis Bacon Act, or service
work, subject to the Service Contract Act (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD-104(e)).
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AFFARS Appendix DD also places a limitation on NPIs for each SABER
delivery order. NPIs shall not exceed ten percent of the total value of the DO without
prior approval by the base commander. However, this waiver authority for NPIs is only
applicable to 25 percent of the total value of the DO.

The justification behind this

limitation is that the need to negotiate a number of NPIs reduces the efficiency of the
SABER contract (AFFARS DD, 2000:DD- 104(d)).

Other Areas
There were a number of issues identified during the interviews that were
particular to each base's situation. Some of these issues were relevant to the research
while others were issues that could be further examined. These areas are presented at the
end of each case study in Chapter IV.

Summary
Chapter II provided a literature review on the current literature available
regarding the SABER program. Chapter III, Methodology, will provide the research
methodology used in collecting the data to meet the research objective. Chapter IV,
Analysis, will present the data gathered during the interviews. Chapter V, Results and
Conclusions, will provide the results from the research as well as any conclusions that
can be made based on the research data collected.
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III. Methodology

Chapter III presents the methodology that was used to acquire and analyze the
data for this research effort.

Overview
The objective of this research effort was to identify and analyze any conditions
that may have been created by the current SABER acquisition process that led to SABER
contractor failures. There were no anticipated results prior to conducting the research and
data collection. The acquisition process for any Government contract, in this case
SABER contracts, is extensive. A number of processes and procedures are incorporated
into the Government's acquisition process. The major processes within a SABER
acquisition include the source selection process, the contract award process, and the
contract performance process. Each process can be further segmented into additional
processes. For instance, the source selection process can be separated into the process of
selecting a source selection team, the process of creating evaluation criteria for evaluation
purposes, and the process of determining whether limitations will be placed on a bidders'
proposal.
Due to this inherent nature of the Government acquisition process, the task of
attempting to identify problem areas within the overall process without focusing on an
area or a number of specific areas is nearly impossible. For this reason, the scope of this
research was narrowed to one overall research question with five specific subsidiary
research questions within the SABER acquisition process. The research question
developed was:
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Are there any Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process
that are leading to contractor failure during the contract's period of performance?
The five subsidiary research questions selected for this research effort were:
(1) What was the Government's method of pricing the SABER contract? Did this
pricing method negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily
perform?
(2) What role, if applicable, did liquidated damages have during the performance
of the SABER contract? Did the assessment of liquidated damages, when
applied, negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on
existing and future SABER DOs?
(3) Does the Government reimburse the contractor for the cost of preparing a bid
for a project that is eventually not executed? If not, did this practice negatively
impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract?
(4) How does the Government balance the issuance of SABER delivery orders
over the course of the contract period? Where there any surges, particularly in the
fiscal year 4th quarter, that negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability to
satisfactorily perform?
(5) Was there any inappropriate use of the SABER contract? If so, did this
negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform?

Method Selection
As stated in Chapter 1, Research Methodology, a qualitative methodology was
used to conduct the research. Specifically, the case study methodology was selected as
the most beneficial way to meet the objective of the research.
Yin identified three conditions to assist a researcher in determining the type of
research strategy to use for a research topic (Yin, 1994:4-6). Yin also provided a table,
Table 1, which identifies five resource strategies along with the three conditions (Yin,
1994:6).
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Table 1. Five Research Strategies and Three Conditions for Selection Criteria
(Yin, 1994:6)
CONDITIONS

Strategy
Experiment

Survey

Requires control
over behavioral
events?

Focuses on
contemporary
events?

how, why

yes

yes

who, what, where,

no

yes

no

yes/no

Form of research
question

how many,
how much
who, what, where,

Archival analysis

how many,
how much

History

how, why

no

no

Case study

how, why

no

yes
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The underlying question of this research concerned "why" or "how" these
SABER contractors are failing. There was no attempt to control behavioral events and
the research focused on contemporary events. Therefore, the appropriate strategy for this
research was case study analysis.
Yin defined a case study as "...an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within the real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 1994:13).
Based on the recommendation of Yin, the process used for this research effort was
broken into four stages. These stages entail the:
-

design of the case study;
performance of the case study;
analysis of the case study evidence;
development of the conclusions and recommendations.

Design of the Case Study
Given the objective of this research, the design of the case study targeted specific
SABER contracts. Seven Air Force bases were selected as case study subjects by the
researcher and the researcher's sponsors, SAF/AQCO and AFIT/CEM. The seven bases
represent three Major Commands throughout three states in the continental United States
(CONUS). The three states cover the eastern and southern CONUS. The three states are
geographically separated in an effort to reduce any regional effects on the data collected.
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Of the seven bases selected, three bases terminated their SABER contractor for
default, one base terminated for convenience, one base identified the contract as failing,
and the remaining two bases did not have SABER contractors in a failed or failing
situation.
Yin identified six sources of evidence used in case study research (Yin, 1994:79 ■
90). Table 2 presents the six sources alongside the strengths and weaknesses of each
source.

32

Table 2. The Six Sources of Evidence Identified by Yin
Weaknesses

Strengths

Source of Evidence

retrievability, biased
selectivity (if collection
is not complete),
reporting bias, access

stable, unobtrusive, exact,
broad coverage (wide span of
events)

Documentation

-

same as above

same as above

Archival records
accessibility due to
privacy reasons

precise and quantitative

-

-

bias due to poorly
constructed questions,
response bias,
inaccuracies due to
poor recall, reflexivity

Interviews

targeted (focused on specific
topic), insightful

Direct observations

reality (observing in real time);
contextual

time-consuming,
selectivity, reflexivity,
cost

observation

same as above for direct
observations, insightful into
interpersonal behavior and
motives

same as above for
direct observations,
bias due to
investigator's
manipulation of events
selectivity, availability

Physical artifacts

insightful into cultural features
and technical operations

Participant-
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The primary source of evidence used in this research effort was interviews.
Interviews provided the researcher with the ability to gain insightful information on each
base's SABER process. Another benefit of the interview was the ability to focus the
interview on the individual situation specific to each base.
A questionnaire was developed for preparation and guidance for conducting the
interviews. The questionnaire was separated into questions dealing with the SABER
background information for pre-award and post-award as well as a number of specific
questions related to the execution of the SABER contract. The questionnaire can be
found in Appendix B, Field Visit and Interview Guide. The questions were developed by
the researcher, the researcher's advisor, and coordinated through the researcher's
sponsors. The questionnaire was sent to each base prior to conducting the interview.
The second source of evidence was the collection of copies of documentation.
Each base maintains a contract file that contains all relevant information regarding the
SABER contract. Yin states "For case studies, the most important use of documents is to
corroborate and augment evidence from other sources" (Yin, 1994:81). In this research
effort, the collection of documentation, when necessary, supported the statements made
by the interviewees.

Limitations of the Research
There are a number of limitations to this research effort. The SABER contractor
was not contacted during the data collection process. The rationale for this decision was
two-fold. The primary rationale was due to potential legal issues between the
Government and the contractor in a failed situation. One of the case studies involved the
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Situation where the Government was at the initial stages of a failed situation. In addition,
a number of case studies involved situations where the contractor was no longer in the
local area of the base. These situations involved contractors that had gone out of
business. The decision not to interview the contractor will limit the overall analysis, as
the research will only collect one side of the story in each case study.
Other areas of concern in this area included the rapid turnover of Government
personnel. In some cases, the individuals who were part of the SABER source selection
process were no longer at that base due to change of assignments or separation from
Government service. This impacted the ability of the current personnel to provide
background information regarding various aspects of the base's SABER contract.

Validity and Reliability of the Research
Four tests that are commonly used by researchers to address the quality of any
empirical research study include construct validity, internal validity, external validity,
and reliability. Yin provides a table, Table 3, of these four tests along with a case study
tactic and the phase to use this tactic in an effort to strengthen the applicable test (Yin,
1994:33).
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Table 3. Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests
(Yin, 1994:33)

Case study tactic

Phase of research in which
tactic occurs

Tests

Construct validity

use multiple sources of
evidence

-

data collection

establish chain of
evidence

-

data collection

have key informants
review draft case study
report

composition

do pattern-matching

data analysis

do explanation-building

data analysis

do time-series analysis

data analysis

Internal validity

-

use replication or logic
in multiple-case studies

-

use case study protocol

External validity

-

research design

data collection

Reliability
develop case study data
base
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-

data collection

Construct Validity
Yin described construct validity as "...establishing correct operational measures
for the concepts being studied." (Yin, 1994:33-34). In an effort to strengthen the
construct validity of this research, two sources of evidence, interviews and
documentation, were selected in lieu of just one or the other. The use of these two
sources compliments each other. The documentation gathered supported the responses
provided during the interview. In addition, the interview provided the researcher with a
number of details that documentation could not provide, such as the political environment
that existed during the SABER contract's period of performance.

Internal Validity
Internal validity, as described by Yin, is establishing a causal relationship versus a
false, or spurious, relationship from the research data (Yin, 1994:33,35). Each case study
subject had the opportunity to review the case study data prior to its inclusion into this
study. The purpose of this review was to ensure that the researcher accurately portrayed
the information and the meaning of that information provided by the contracting and civil
engineering personnel.
The research effort was geared towards establishing a potential causal relationship
based on any Government action that led to the failure on the part of the SABER
contractor. The coding process, as explained below, was designed in an effort to
compare individual base's situations to discern if a causal pattern existed on a macrolevel.
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External Validity
Yin identified external validity as "...establishing the domain to which a study's
findings can be generalized." (Yin, 1994:33, 35-36). To strengthen external validity, the
same research design was replicated for each of the seven case studies.
This research focused on five aspects of the overall SABER acquisition process as
potential conditions that may have led to SABER contractor failure. However, the
questionnaire included a number of questions regarding the wide spectrum of the SABER
acquisition process. This research could be replicated with a number of other bases not
used in this research.

Reliability
Yin stated, "The objective is to be sure that, if a later investigator followed
exactly the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the
same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings
and conclusions." (Yin, 1994:33, 36-37).
The reliability test has been addressed throughout Chapter 3. The design of this
research was geared to allow future researchers to use the same protocol and obtain the
same results.

Execution of the Case Study
Coordination for the case studies was through SAF/AQCO and each MAJCOMs
contracting point of contact for SABER contracts. A copy of Appendix A, First Contact
with Primary Point of Contact, was sent to each base prior to the interview. Upon arrival
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at each Air Force base, the initial meeting was with the Contracting Squadron's
commander or deputy commander when that individual was available.
Following this initial meeting, interviews were conducted with the Contracting
Squadron's SABER contracting officer and SABER contract administrator(s). These
individuals compose the contracting portion of the SABER program. In addition to the
contracting personnel, interviews were held with five of the seven bases' SABER civil
engineer personnel.
The interview process was semi-structured. Interviews covered specific topics
related to the five subsidiary research questions. In addition, the interviews addressed a
number of additional areas relating to the SABER acquisition process. These questions,
as identified in Appendix B, were identified as potential areas for future research in this
area.
Several of the case studies involved situations where the SABER contractor failed
in the performance of the contract. In these situations, the focus of the interview was
directed at the circumstances, as determined by the interviewees, which led to the
contractor failure.
Prior to the interview, each interviewee was provided an overview of the research
effort. Each interview was audiotaped to allow the researcher to review the information
prior to documenting each case study. All subjects were questioned prior to conducting
the interview concerning their preference not to be audiotaped; no one declined.
Interviewees were assured of their and their base's anonymity and were asked to be direct
and truthful during the interview. The case study analysis was provided to both the
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contracting and civil engineering personnel for comments and concerns prior to this
publishing.

Analysis of the Case Study Evidence
The researcher gathered a large quantity of data during the execution phase of the
research effort. A total of seven case studies were performed over a two-week period. In
addition to the large amount of documentation collected, there were numerous hours of
audiotape to review for this effort. To identify whether there were any conditions created
by the Government in the SABER acquisition process that led to the SABER contractor's
failure was likened to finding the proverbial needle in the haystack. Novak addressed
such a dilemma by stating:
We moved to the use almost exclusively of interviews...but then we were faced
with numerous audiotapes or typed transcripts of the tapes. It was exceedingly
difficult to analyze these records and find patterns or regularities that could help
us understand how and why... (Novak, 1998:27).
Faced with a similar situation, a process was needed to code the data into a
manageable form. The researcher used a process espoused by Strauss and Corbin
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Strauss and Corbin describe three stages of coding that was
used in this research effort.
Stage one involved open coding, which is the process of breaking down and
conceptualizing the data gathered.
Stage two, known as axial coding, involves the process of conducting a cross-case
analysis of all data relevant to the research effort. For this research effort, axial coding
consisted of identifying all data relevant to each of the five subsidiary research questions.
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Finally, the third stage, called selective coding, involved identifying any common
data found throughout the case studies and determining whether the data impacted the
SABER contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the SABER contract.
To document the coding process, the researcher used a technique called mindmapping (Buzan and Buzan, 1993:59). The mind-map is a manifestation of radiant
thinking. Radiant thinking involves the process of creating ideas and thoughts from a
central point. These thoughts burst out from the central point. The mind-map is the
written expression of radiant thinking (Buzan and Buzan, 1993:53-69). The use of a
mind-map encourages radiant thinking in place of linear or hierarchical thinking.
Figure 1 contains the mind-map used for this research effort. The central point,
Government-controlled actions or procedures that impact contractor performance,
represented the central theme of the research effort: are there any Government-controlled
factors that led to the SABER contractor's failure? Five of the six main themes
corresponded to the five subsidiary research questions. The final theme-Other areas
identified during case studies-represented additional information gathered during the
case study execution that was pertinent to the situation. Opportunities for future research
efforts are identified from this theme.
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Figure 1. Mind Map Designed for the Research Effort

Organization of the Remaining Report
Chapter IV, Analysis, reports the findings of each case study. Each case study
was documented in the following manner:
Base X Analysis
Background Information - This section introduces the case study. Items
presented include the relevant facts of the SABER contract. Such facts include
the amount and period of the SABER contract.
Five Areas Relating to the Subsidiary Questions - A section is dedicated to
discuss, in detail, the responses to the five subsidiary questions that the research
targeted. The titles of each section are Pricing Methodology, Liquidated
Damages, Project Estimating Fees, Balanced Work, and Inappropriate Use.
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Other Areas - As previously identified, this section identifies relevant issues,
excluding the five targeted areas, pertaining to each bases situation.
Chapter IV also provides a cross-case analysis of the seven case studies.
Comparisons are made across the board for each of the six themes identified in the mindmap. The purpose of this cross-referencing was to identify whether the five areas were
consistent with one another. This allowed a comparison to whether the case studies that
resulted in a failed situation were any different to those case studies that were not in a
failed situation. This comparison assisted in identifying whether the specific area, e.g.
Use of liquidated damages, was a relevant factor in the failure of the SABER contractors
at different bases.
Chapter V, Results and Conclusions, states the results from the research. In
addition, Chapter V identifies future research efforts. These topics were identified during
the interview and data collection process as potential candidates of causal relationships
regarding Government-controlled actions that may lead to SABER contractor failure.
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IV. Analysis

Chapter IV is separated into two sections. The first section provides an in-depth
case study analysis on each installation's SABER program. The analysis focuses on the
five subsidiary research questions as well as any other areas of interest that were
identified during the interview and field visit. The second section of Chapter 4 contains a
cross-case review of the six areas in an effort to identify any trends across the seven
installations studied during this research effort.

Overview
Each analysis is covered separately and is identified as Base A through Base G.
Each case study analysis consists of a brief summation on the background information of
the SABER program at the base studied. The next portion of the analysis is dedicated to
each of the five subsidiary research questions in the following order: Pricing
Methodology, Liquidated Damages, Project Estimating Fees, Balanced Work, and
Inappropriate Use. Following this is a section, Other Areas, which provides additional
areas of interest that were identified during the case study interviews. Each case study
write-up was provided to the respective installations for review of content and accuracy
prior to publishing.
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Base A Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base A was established for a
maximum of five years, base period with four option periods, with a set minimum dollar
amount of $200,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $5,000,000 per period of
performance.
Nine contractors bid for the contract during the source selection period. There
were no 8(a) small business set-asides for this contract. The contract was awarded to a
large firm that had SABER contracts at other bases as well as substantial experience in
construction contracting with the Air Force.
The contract was approximately five weeks into its third option period when a
high-level executive for the contractor informed the base contracting squadron
commander and the SABER personnel that the contractor would close operations within
30 days.
Within its letter of notification, the contractor identified that a criminal action,
embezzlement, by one of its employees resulted in the financial insolvency of the firm.
The contractor also informed the Government personnel that the contractor's employees
and subcontractors would be immediately notified of the situation.
In time, the contractor was terminated for default and the bonding company took
over the open delivery orders on the work that had not been completed.
Base contracting personnel stated that the contractor performed satisfactorily on
the contract prior to this incident. They also stated that the contract probably would have
been renewed for the fourth option period if this incident did not occur.
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Pricing Methodology. The SABER contract's pricing structure was based from
the RS Means database. The RS Means book was updated annually. The contractor was
required to procure the annual updates and provide copies to both base contracting and
civil engineering personnel.
The contract had four coefficients for four contract line items for each period of
performance. Two coefficients were for standard working hours for two separate
locations, the base and an additional facility not physically attached to the base. The
remaining two coefficients were for non-standard working hours for the same two
locations. The contract identified standard working hours.
The contractor proposed negative coefficients for each of the contract line items.
A contractor who quotes a negative coefficient, which is below 1.0, is proposing that the
work can be accomplished by the contractor at less than the contract pricing book costs
including any locality adjustment for that contract's area. Base civil engineering
personnel expressed concern regarding this fact. One inspector questioned whether
SABER contracts should be awarded to any contractor that proposes a negative
coefficient.
Despite the fact that the contract was awarded to a firm that proposed negative
coefficients, it does not appear that the Government's action in this area negatively
impacted the contractor's performance thereby resulting in the contractor failing.
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was used on each SABER
delivery order. The amount of liquidated damages was approximately $140 per day
beyond the expiration date of the delivery order.
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Contracting personnel stated that liquidated damages were not assessed
extensively on the contract. In addition, the contracting officer stated that there appeared
to be no domino effect that affected other open delivery orders once liquidated damages
were assessed on an individual delivery order. The following scenario provides an
example of domino effect. The SABER contractor is being assessed liquidated damages
against DO 1. To alleviate the situation, the contractor moves personnel from DO 2 and
DO 3 to DO 1 to finish the work. Due to the personnel shift, the contractor then falls
behind and is assessed liquidated damages on DO 2 and DO 3.
The contracting officer further identified that the contractor never provided
negative feedback that the assessment of liquidated damages on an individual delivery
negatively impacted its ability to perform on any outstanding delivery orders.
It does not appear that the Government's use of liquidated damages negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract.
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained a contract line item for
a project estimating fee. The shelf life for the project estimating proposals was one year.
If the DO was awarded, the cost for preparing the proposal was absorbed into the overall
cost of the awarded DO. This line item was used less than 10 times over the period of the
contract. The contracting officer noted that the line item could have been used more
often. However, the contractor voluntarily provided a majority of project estimations at
no cost to the Government. These free estimates were provided on projects awaiting
fiscal end of year fall-out funding.
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It does not appear that the contractor's failure to charge the Government for
project estimations negatively impacted their ability to perform satisfactorily on the
contract.
Balanced Work. Throughout each period of performance, the SABER contractor
experienced a fiscal year 4th quarter surge as a result of the Government committing
dollars prior to losing them on 1 October.
The contracting officer stated that the contractor never expressed concern that the
workload was overwhelming. Furthermore, the contractor never attempted to refuse any
projects during the contract performance period.
It does not appear that 4th quarter surges negatively impacted the contractor's
ability to perform in a satisfactory manner.
Inappropriate Use. Based on current government laws and AFFARS Appendix
DD limitations, the contracting personnel did not identify any attempts of inappropriate
use, of the SABER contract at Base A. However, the civil engineering personnel
expressed concern that the SABER program has turned into an inappropriate program to
quickly obligate end of year funds on projects that may have been better suited for
individual competitive procurements.
It does not appear that the Government's actions in this area negatively impacted
the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily.
Other Areas. There were a number of areas of concern identified by contracting
and civil engineering personnel during the interview process.
Contracting personnel stated that the dollar expenditures on the SABER contract
have decreased over the years. Two speculations on the root cause of this reduction were
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identified. First, the decreasing DoD budget has negatively affected a majority of the
programs and the program's expenditure levels. Second, the Air Force contracting
squadron on Base A faces procurement competition from the Navy and Army. The Navy
maintains a three-person office on Base A and actively pursues Air Force business on the
base. In addition, an Army post is located within 30 minutes of Base A. The Army
contracting office has a JOC contract in place that Base A has used in the past and is
currently using until a new SABER contract is in place. There are no firm cost figures on
how much potential SABER business has been placed through the Navy or Army
contracting offices.
A second area of interest identified was the need for personnel to attend source
selection classes prior to entering a SABER source selection. Civil engineering
personnel identified a number of courses offered through the Army that prepares
individuals for source selections.
A third area of interest that was identified by civil engineering personnel
involved a claim that the subcontractors were not getting paid in a timely manner. This
resulted in the subcontractors abandoning some sites and refusing to work for the prime
contractor on future projects. The prime contractor was then forced to hire less qualified
workers. This resulted in low quality workmanship.

Base B Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base B was established for a
maximum of five years, base period with four options. The contract had a minimum
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dollar amount of $200,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $4,000,000 per period of
performance.
There were a total of 10 bidders that submitted proposals for the SABER contract.
There were no 8(a) small business set-asides for this contract. The contract was awarded
to a large firm that had SABER contract experience on other Air Force bases.
The contract was awarded in May 1997 and was used infrequently during the first
year. This was the second SABER contract awarded on Base B. The contracting officer
stated that the SABER program was not initially wanted on Base B. Base B is located in
close proximity to an Army post and the Air Force was using the Army JOC contract
prior to the implementation of the SABER program. However, Base Bs MAJCOM
mandated that a SABER contract be put in place. The use of SABER did increase
following the initial period of performance in 1997.
In the third option period, problems arose with the SABER contractor. The
contractor experienced a large surge in delivery orders due to preparations for a major Air
Force training exercise. This situation is covered in detail under Balanced Workload.
In addition, the contractor had major difficulties obtaining subcontractors for
projects. This resulted in the contractor having limited capability to manage its
workload. The contracting officer stated that the contractor could only handle two DOs
at a time.
A week before the field visit, the SABER contracting officer issued three cure
notices and one show cause letter to the contractor for delinquent work.
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Pricing Methodology. Base B used the RS Means database to price DOs on its
SABER contract. The contractor was required to procure annual updates and provide
copies to both base contracting and civil engineering personnel.
The contract had three coefficients for three working level contract line items.
One coefficient was for regular working hours; one for non-regular working hours; and a
third for concentrated work. Concentrated work included work that involved unexpected
mission changes, extremely short performance periods, or damage repair as a result of a
natural or unnatural disaster.
The contractor proposed negative coefficients for each of the contract line items.
The coefficients ranged from 0.88 for regular working hours to 0.918 for both nonregular working hours and concentrated work.
The contracting officer stated that both the Government and the contractor were
comfortable with using the R.S. Means price book on the contract. It does not appear that
the Government's action in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
perform satisfactorily on the SABER contract.
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was applied to every
delivery order valued over $25,000. The use of the liquidated damages clause for orders
under $25,000 was made on a case-by-case basis.
The contracting officer stated that there had never been a monetary assessment of
liquidated damages prior to the interview. However, the assessment of liquidated
damages on open DOs was imminent due to the contractor's inability to perform in a
timely manner. In a few instances, the Government took non-monetary consideration in
lieu of money on orders that went beyond the DO expiration date.
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Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted.
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained a line item for project
estimations. The cost of the estimation was based on the magnitude of the project. For
projects with an estimated total of $25,000 or less, the project estimating fee was $500;
project magnitude estimations between $25,000 to $100,000 cost $800; and estimates that
were over $100,000 cost $1,200.
The project estimating line item was used infrequently and only during
preparation for end of fiscal year fall-out. The shelf life for the estimation was one year.
The contracting personnel did not mention any instances where the contractor provided
project estimations at no cost to the Government.
There does not appear to be any evidence to support the Government actions in
this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the
SABER contract.
Balanced Work. As previously stated, the SABER contract was used infrequently
during the first period of performance. As the base prepared for a high-level Air Force
exercise for 2000, the SABER contractor experienced a large surge in the amount of
work awarded. Most of this work consisted of facility renovation and improvement
projects.
In addition, the contracting officer noted that a number of interested personnel
directly contacted the contractor to emphasize the importance of the DOs related to the
exercise. Individuals went so far as to prioritize the work without the contracting
officer's knowledge that such actions were taking place.
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The contracting officer noted that this situation resulted in the contractor falling
behind schedule on DOs not associated with the exercise. Following the surge, the
contracting officer gave the contractor the opportunity to adjust performance periods on
uncompleted DOs. The DOs were modified to reflect the adjusted periods. However, the
contracting officer noted that the contractor did not recover from that period.
Although the contractor was not in default at the time of the data collection, the
actions of the Government in this matter negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
perform satisfactorily on the contract.
Inappropriate Use. There had been previous attempts to use the contract for
work, such as single-trade projects, that is inappropriate for a SABER contract. The
SABER contracting officer refused to issue SABER delivery orders on the work and the
requirements were sent back to the customer or forwarded to another branch of the
contracting office to handle appropriately.
It does not appear that the Government's actions in this area negatively impacted
the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily.
Other Areas. The existence of competition for work on Base B is evident. With
SABER in place, Air Force customers no longer use the Army JOC contract. However,
the Army does compete for work on Base B. The Army Corps of Engineers has an office
on Base B. A number of projects that were SABER eligible were given to the Corps of
Engineers. For example, the Corps of Engineers had all of the base's runway projects
and a number of base housing projects.
The contracting officer also noted that the SABER contractor had difficulty hiring
reliable subcontractors to work on the SABER contract. This was due to the large
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amount of construction projects at the Army post that is located near Base B. The
contracting officer believed the limited number of qualified subcontractors negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to handle more than two delivery orders at any given
time. This resulted in potential SABER projects being procured under traditional
construction contracting methods versus being awarded as a SABER delivery order.

Base C Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base C was established for a
maximum of five years, base period with four option periods, with a set minimum dollar
amount of $200,000 per period of performance with a maximum dollar amount of
$15,000,000 over the life of the contract.
A total of 13 contractors placed a bid for the contract during the source selection
process. This was not an 8(a) small business set-aside contract. The contract was
awarded to a large firm that had SABER contracts at other bases as well as substantial
experience in construction contracting with the Air Force.
The contractor at Base C was also the firm that was awarded the SABER contract
at Base A. As with Base A, the SABER contract was in its third option period when the
contractor defaulted on the contract. The contracting officer noted that the contractor was
performing satisfactorily on the contract. The third option had just been exercised when
the default situation occurred.
Pricing Methodology. R.S. Means was the price book used on this SABER
contract. The contractor was required to procure annual updates and provide copies to
the SABER contracting and civil engineering offices.
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The contract contained four coefficients per period of performance. The
coefficients were for standard and non-standard hours for two separate locations, the base
and an additional facility not physically attached to the base.
The coefficients during the first two periods of performance were negative. The
coefficients applicable to projects completed on base were 0.921 for standard hours and
0.983 for non-standard hours during the initial contract period. The coefficients during
the first option period were 0.926 and 0.988 respectively.
Prior to the execution of the third option period, a contract modification was done
which increased the coefficients for option year 2 and subsequent periods. The
coefficients for projects on base rose 0.063, 0.058, and 0.053 for standard working hours
for option periods 2, 3, and 4. Similar increases were applied to the remaining
coefficients. There was no documented justification or consideration for this
modification. However, contracting personnel noted that the price increases within the
modification did not displace any other bidder and was given legal review prior to
approval.
Since the contractor failed due to an internal criminal action, there is no evidence
that conclusively supports that the Government's actions negatively impacted the
contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform. However, the modification to raise
coefficients without consideration suggests that the Government was possibly attempting
to right a wrong by raising the coefficients to allow the contractor to recover past losses.
One could only speculate whether the contractor would continue to satisfactorily perform
given this situation.
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Liquidated Damages. Liquidated damages were assessed on a number of delivery
orders throughout the life of the contract. Contracting personnel stated that there
appeared to be no domino effect when liquidated damages were assessed.
It does not appear that the Government's use of liquidated damages negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform the contract.
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained project estimating line
items. The cost of the estimation was based on the magnitude of the project. Estimations
for projects less than $25,000 cost $1,200; for projects between $25,000 and $100,000,
the cost for the estimation was $1,750; and for projects greater than $100,000, the cost for
the estimation was $3,000. These costs were the same for each period of performance.
Project estimations had a shelf life of one year.
Data provided by the contracting personnel identified 15 occasions that the
project estimating line item was used. All 15 uses were for preparation of fiscal year-end
fallout. The contracting personnel did not mention any instances where the contractor
provided project estimations at no cost to the Government.
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform.
Balanced Work. On data collected from the contracting personnel, a majority of
the SABER workload was awarded during the fiscal year 4th quarter. Approximately 65
percent of 113 delivery orders reviewed were awarded during the 4th quarter.
The SABER contracting personnel noted that the contractor had not expected the
large surge in delivery orders during the 4th quarter. Furthermore, the local area did not
have the infrastructure, specifically the manpower, needed to handle so much work at any
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given time. Government personnel had to work with the contractor to establish schedules
of performance on each delivery order that was fair for both the contractor and the
customer.
Although the amount of work was unexpected, the Government and contractor
worked around this issue to avoid future problems. Therefore, it does not appear that 41
quarter surges negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform in a satisfactory
manner.
Inappropriate Use. The contracting officer noted that there were no incidents of
inappropriate use of the SABER contract. Therefore, there was no potential negative
impact on the contractor's ability to perform.
Other Areas. A new SABER contract was in place at Base C during the field
visit. One concern identified regarding the new contract is the price book. The R.S.
Means book is being used on the new SABER contract. The contract was awarded to a
large construction firm with significant Air Force SABER experience at other bases. All
of the contractor's coefficients are positive. One possible explanation of a positive
coefficient proposed within a bid indicates that the contractor believes the R.S. Means
prices are slightly lower than the market prices surrounding the area. The closest city
listed in the R.S. Means City Cost Index (CCI) is over 60 miles away. The contracting
officer believes that local costs are higher than the adjusted CCI price. The contractor
has provided feedback to the contracting officer regarding the discrepancy between the
price book and actual local costs. The contractor claims that they are losing money more
often than making a profit on many delivery orders.
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The contracting officer further stated that he believed the price differences are
negatively affecting the contractor's ability to meet the cost of the work under the
contract.

Base D Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract researched at Base D was
awarded as an 8(a) set-aside for a period of one year. The contract was awarded
following a series of capabilities briefings of the six best qualified contractors as
identified by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Following the six briefings,
SABER civil engineering and contracting personnel selected the best-rated contractor.
The contract was awarded in June 1999 for a minimum dollar amount of $100,000
and a maximum amount of $3,000,000. At that time, the contractor selected already had
two other SABER contracts as well as significant experience with other construction
projects.
In selecting this SABER contractor, traditional source selection procedures were
not used. The previous SABER contractor, a large firm, was not renewed for a second
option term leaving the Government with little time to conduct a SABER source
selection. Under the circumstances, the contracting officer opted to award a one-year
SABER contract through the SBA. This approach allowed the Government the necessary
time to conduct a normal source selection. Unfortunately, this would not happen.
In early April 2000, the contractor notified the contracting officer at Base D that
the contractor was having financial problems. The contractor claimed it had over
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$1,300,000 in accounts receivable from its customers. The contractor was also having
difficulty with its SABER contract at Base E.
On 20 July 2000, the SABER contractor's president notified the contracting
officer at Base D that the company filed for bankruptcy and all work would be halted. At
this time, the contract at Base D had expired; however, there were 17 open delivery
orders that needed to be completed. Eventually, the contracting officer terminated for
default each delivery order.
Pricing Methodology. Base D used the R.S. Means book for pricing delivery
orders. Previous SABER contracts on Base D used locally developed unit price books.
Contracting and civil engineer personnel agreed to change to the R.S. Means book in lieu
of attempting to update the locally developed unit price book. The contractor was
familiar with the R.S. Means pricing book since it used R.S. Means on its other SABER
contracts.
The contract's coefficient for standard work hours was 1.169. Prior to award,
Base Ds MAJCOM provided pricing assistance to the source selection team and verified
that the coefficient proposed would cover the contractor's expenses.
There does not appear to be any Government action in this area that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract.
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was included on each
delivery order. The amount of liquidated damages varied dependent on mission impact.
The contracting officer stated that liquidated damages were never assessed against the
contractor on this contract.
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Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted.
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract did not contain a project
estimating fee line item. The contractor voluntarily provided end of fiscal year estimates
under a hold harmless agreement. The agreement stated that the contractor
acknowledged the fact that the project requested under the Government's request for
proposal may not be executed and the costs for preparing the estimate were not
reimbursable. The contracting officer stated that all of the projects under this agreement
were executed; therefore, the contractor did not suffer a loss of revenue from preparing
estimates that were not executed.
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform.
Balanced Work. A total of 22 delivery orders were awarded on the contract. Of
the 22, 13 orders were awarded in the 4th quarter of the fiscal year 1999. Government
personnel had some concern regarding the contractor's ability to handle the workload.
SABER civil engineering and contracting personnel identified customers'
requirements and worked with the contractor to establish a balanced schedule. However,
the contracting officer stated the fact that the contractor could not keep up with the work
and suggested that the Government may have overextended the contractor during this
time period.
The civil engineering SABER chief disagreed and suggested that the contractor
grew too fast too soon. At the time, the contractor had four other major contracts
including two SABER contracts with other bases, a local school district contract, and a
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contract with the Army Corps of Engineers. The CE SABER chief inferred that the
contractor's management could not handle the rapid growth the company experienced in
a brief amount of time.
Given this information, there existed some possibility that the Government's
actions may have negatively affected the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily.
The Government's actions do not appear to be the result of a single installation's actions,
but possibly a cumulative effect from the surge experienced by each contract during the
fiscal end of year surge. However, field visits were also completed at the two
installations where the contractor had SABER contracts, Base E and Base G.
Due to a protest following the award at Base E, actual performance on the
SABER contract did not begin until the first quarter, fiscal year 2000. In addition,
performance on the SABER contract at Base G was concluding at this time. There was
no data gathered from the school district or the Army Corps of Engineers. However, any
cumulative effect by the Government that negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
satisfactorily perform that is based solely on the number of contracts cannot be
established.
In addition, the contractor was not required to accept all work submitted as
SABER projects. The contracting officer noted that the contractor did not refuse any
work submitted under the SABER contract.
Therefore, there is no evidence to support that the Government's action negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract.
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Inappropriate Use. The contracting officer stated there were no attempts of
inappropriate use of the SABER contract. Therefore, there was no potential negative
impact on the contractor's ability to perform.
Other Areas. The contracting officer noted there was no competition with other
DoD agencies regarding potential SABER work.

Base E Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base E was awarded for a
maximum of five years, base period with four options, with a set minimum dollar amount
of $50,000 per period of performance and a maximum dollar amount of $35,000,000 for
the life of the contract.
The award of this contract was based on the reopening of discussions from the
previous SABER solicitation. The original SABER solicitation included an 8(a) small
business set-aside and was awarded in January 1998 to a local small business. There was
a post-award protest that contained two allegations. The first allegation was that the
Government was not clear on certain technical issues within its solicitation. The second
allegation was that the small business that was awarded the contract had a partnering
arrangement with a large construction firm and therefore was not actually a small
business. Following legal review, the Government's lawyers advised the contracting
officer to reopen discussions.
A total of seven contractors placed a bid for the SABER contract. The firm
chosen was the same contractor that had the SABER contracts at Base D and Base G.
The contract was awarded in August 1999. Once again, there was a post-award protest
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and the performance of the contract was put on hold until December 1999 when the court
lifted the stay.
There were a limited amount of delivery orders issued on this contract. Under
contract requirements, the Government SABER personnel requested a technical proposal
prior to requesting a cost proposal. Both contracting and civil engineering personnel
noted that the contractor had difficulty providing acceptable technical proposals. This
resulted in numerous rewrites and delayed the award of delivery orders. The CE SABER
chief noted that the personnel originally identified to work on the contract in the
contractor's proposal was not the same personnel once the contract was in place. The CE
SABER chief also noted that the personnel working on the contract were less qualified
and experienced than the personnel originally proposed. Therefore, the Government
SABER personnel spent extensive time with the contractor in an attempt to improve the
quality of the technical proposals. Since few technical proposals were accepted prior to
the company's break-up, there were only a few delivery orders actually awarded on the
SABER contract.
The contracting officer was informed in April 2000 of the financial difficulties the
contractor was facing. On 20 July 2000, the contractor's president notified the
contracting officer at Base E that the company filed for bankruptcy and all work would
be halted. The contracting officer terminated the contract for convenience on 31 July
2000.
Pricing Methodology. Base E used the R.S. Means book for pricing delivery
orders. The contractor was familiar with the R.S. Means pricing book since it used R.S.
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Means on its other SABER contracts. The contract's coefficient for work hours ranged
from 1.138 to 1.188.
There does not appear to be any Government actions in this area that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract.
Liquidated Damages. Liquidated damages were not assessed against any delivery
orders on the contract.
Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted.
Project Estimating Fees. The SABER contract contained a Project Estimating &
Design (PE&D) fee line item. The PE&D fee was based on the magnitude of the project.
The contractor received $500 for projects estimated under $25,000; $1,000 for projects
estimated between $25,000 to $200,000; and $2,000 for projects estimated over
$200,000.
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform.
Balanced Work. The actual performance of the SABER contract lasted seven
months with few delivery orders actually executed on the contract. There were no
delivery orders awarded during the 4th quarter.
There does not appear to be any Government actions in this area that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract.
Inappropriate Use. The contracting personnel did not note any inappropriate
actions as it related to this SABER contract.
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There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform.
Other Areas. The contracting personnel stated that there have not been any
competition-related concerns for the SABER program at Base E.
The contracting and civil engineering personnel identified that the contractor had
problems with the minimal design issue. The CE SABER chief stated that the quality of
the technical proposals were unacceptable. He noted that the design provided to the
Government as part of the contractor's original bid was top-notch. However, the
contractor had difficulty meeting acceptable standards once the contract was in place.
Through numerous teaming meetings, the SABER personnel attempted to resolve the
situation with the contractor. These problems may have been a result of personnel being
reassigned once the award was protested and halted for four months. These individuals
were not the same personnel assigned to the contract once the court stay was lifted in
December 1999.

Base F Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base F was established for a
maximum of three years, the base period with two options, with a set minimum dollar
amount of $20,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $3,000,000 for the life of the
contract. There were no annual minimum or maximum dollar amounts established for the
contract.
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Due to the fact that Base F is located in a rural area that is approximately 155
miles from the closest city, the contract was awarded as an 8(a) small business set-aside
in a sole source environment. The contract was awarded to the incumbent contractor.
At the time of the field visit, the contract was at the end of its first year. The
contract had nine open delivery orders valued over $566,000. Another ten delivery
orders were in the works as the SABER personnel were preparing for end of fiscal year
fallout.
The contract was originally established with the contractor as the prime
contractor. However, numerous quality control problems resulted in a modification
changing the contract to a tripartite arrangement where the SBA is the prime contractor
and the SABER contractor is the subcontractor.
The Government SABER personnel have weekly partnering meetings with the
SBA and the SABER contractor in an effort to improve the quality of contract
performance.
Pricing Methodology. The R.S. Means book is used for pricing delivery orders at
Base F. The contractor has not indicated dissatisfaction with the use of the R.S. Means
book. The contract's coefficient was negotiated prior to contract award. The contractor
originally proposed a coefficient of 1.435. The final negotiated coefficient was 1.33.
There does not appear to be any Government action in this area that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract.
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was applied to each of the
nine delivery orders. Liquidated damages were only assessed against one delivery order
for a total of three days.
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There does not appear to be any negative impact to the contractor's ability to
satisfactorily perform on the contract when liquidated damages were assessed.
Project Estimating Fees. The contract does not have a project estimating fee line
item. The contract administrator noted that the contractor voluntarily submitted
proposals for potential work with the understanding that the costs for preparing those
proposals were not reimbursable if the delivery orders were not awarded. These
proposals were prepared as part of the end of the fiscal year process. The contract
administrator noted that a majority of these projects were awarded during the previous
fiscal year closeout.
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform.
Balanced Work. The contract had approximately ten delivery orders awaiting end
of fiscal year funds.
As the contractor was the incumbent, a similar situation occurred on the previous
SABER contract. The contractor had voiced concern over the traditional 4th quarter
surge. As previously identified, Base F was in a remote locale. Due to the limited labor
force in the area, the contractor has limited ability to expand and contract the number of
personnel available for work at any given time in an effort to meet the demands of the
Government.
In an attempt to alleviate the situation, the Government SABER personnel and the
SABER contractor cover these issues during the weekly partnering meetings. The
objective is to ensure the contractor is not overburdened with 4th quarter surges that
result in late performance completions and/or poor quality work and design.
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There does not appear to be any Government-controlled actions that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform in a satisfactory manner.
Inappropriate Use. The contracting and civil engineering personnel noted there
were no incidents of inappropriate use on the SABER contract
There does not appear to be any evidence to support that the Government's
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform.
Other Areas. The contracting and civil engineering personnel noted that the
contractor had a quality control problem. Specific areas of concern included the
contractor's proposals for delivery orders. Civil engineering personnel believed that the
Government personnel were spending excessive amounts of time reviewing and revising
poorly written contractor proposals.
In addition, the contracting personnel identified that the contractor has stated that
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service was very slow in making payments. The
contractor stated at that time that the slow payments were not impacting the company's
ability to perform.
Base G Analysis
Background Information. The SABER contract at Base G was awarded for a
maximum of five years, base period with four option periods, with a set minimum dollar
amount of $100,000 and a maximum dollar amount of $2,000,000 per period of
performance.
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Nine contractors bid for the contract. The award was an 8(a) small business setaside. The contract was awarded to a small firm that had extensive experience with DoD
construction jobs within the local area.
The contract had been awarded shortly before the field visit. There were 6
delivery orders awarded valued over $400,000. Another 18 projects were in various
stages of the award process. The contracting officer stated that the total would be close
to $1,000,000 for all of the actions.
The previous SABER contractor was the same contractor who was awarded
SABER contracts at Bases D and E. Base G was fortunate that their SABER contract
expired the month that the contractor filed for bankruptcy. No termination actions had to
be taken. However, the Government SABER personnel did note that they had numerous
problems with the previous SABER contractor.
Pricing Methodology. The current SABER contract used the R.S. Means book for
pricing delivery orders. Government and contractor personnel did not indicate
dissatisfaction with the use of the R.S. Means book. The coefficient on the SABER
contract was 1.318.
There does not appear to be any Government action in this area that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily on the contract.
Liquidated Damages. The liquidated damages clause was included on each
delivery order. The amount of liquidated damages varied dependent on mission impact.
The contracting officer stated that liquidated damages were never assessed against the
contractor on this contract.
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Since liquidated damages were not assessed on the contract, the contractor's
ability to perform satisfactorily could not have been negatively impacted.
Project Estimating Fees. The contract does not have a project estimating fee line
item. The Government SABER contracting personnel stated that the contractor
voluntarily submitted proposals for potential work with the understanding that the costs
for preparing those proposals were not reimbursable if the delivery orders were not
awarded. These proposals were prepared as part of the end of the fiscal year process.
The contracting personnel further noted that the contractor did not voice a concern over
this situation.
There does not appear to be any Government-controlled actions that negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to perform in a satisfactory manner.
Balanced Work. Having been recently awarded, the SABER contract was in its
initial period. Therefore, the contractor had yet to experience a 4th quarter surge typical
to SABER contracts. The contract administrator did identify that there were 18 projects
in various stages of preparation for award under SABER. A majority of these awards
would be during September.
Given the fact that the contractor had not yet experienced a surge in activity, there
were no Government-controlled actions that hindered the contractor's ability to
satisfactorily perform.
Inappropriate Use. The contracting officer stated there were no incidents of
inappropriate use of the SABER contract. Therefore, there was no potential negative
impact on the contractor's ability to perform.
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Other Areas. One area identified by the Government SABER personnel was the
lack of discussion within the SABER community. The contracting personnel identified
the use of SABER workshops in the past. The purpose of these workshops was for the
SABER community to gather together to share information and experiences. The
Government SABER personnel believed it would be beneficial to the whole SABER
community to implement a program to allow a cross-flow of information between the
various SABER offices.

Cross-case Analysis
This section covers the cross-case analysis of the research. Table 4 provides an
overview of the results of the cross-case analysis for each of the five areas covered in the
case study analysis.
Table 4. Cross-case Analysis of Five Subsidiary Research Questions
Did Government actions negatively impact contractor's ability to satisfactorily
perform?

Base
A
B
C
D
E
F
G

Pricing
methodology
no
no
possible
no
no
no
no

Liquidated
damages
no
no
no
no
no
no
no

Project
estimating
fees
no
no
no
no
no
no
no

Balanced
word
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no

Inappropriate
use
no
no
no
no
no
no
no

Cross-case Analysis of Pricing Methodology
Figure 2 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the
seven case studies. Each base used the RS Means price book on their SABER contract.

Of the three bases that contained negative coefficients, two of them resulted in a failed
situation. The same contractor failed at both installations. However, the failure was a
result of an internal criminal action by a corporate executive that resulted in the financial
instability that led to the failure.
The situation identified at Base C was not found throughout the other case studies.
There were no other cases where the contract's coefficients were increased by
modification during the performance period.
Therefore, there was no evidence found that might imply that the Government
actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily.

Base's distance
to City Cost N.
Index

Contractor's
experience w/ Means

R.S. Means

Price book used

Locally developed

Delivery
Order
Pricing
methodology

Contractor failed?

Negative (<1.0)
Coefficients

Positive (> 1.0)

Figure 2. Cross-case Analysis of Pricing Methodology
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Cross-case Analysis of Liquidated Damages
Figure 3 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the
seven case studies. Each of the contracts contained the liquidated damages clause. The
clause was included on all delivery orders in six of the seven cases. Base B included the
clause on all orders above $25,000. For orders below $25,000, the determination to
include the clause was made on a case-by-case basis. There was no indication that a
domino effect resulted from the Government assessing liquidated damages.
There was no evidence found throughout the case studies that might imply that
the Government actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
perform satisfactorily.

Consideration in
lieu of LDs

No domino effect

Not used extensively
Case by case
LDs assessed

Over$25k

Criteria for including

Use of
Liquidated
Damages

Not applied to each DO

Used extensively
Contained clause

No domino effect

Applied to each DO

Figure 3. Cross-case Analysis of Use of Liquidated Damages
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Cross-case Analysis of Project Estimating Fees
Figure 4 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the
seven case studies. Five of the seven bases contained project estimating line items within
the contract. Of the five, four bases actively used the line item in preparation for end of
fiscal year fallout.
Four of the seven cases also involved situations where the contractor provided
free estimates. In each case, the contractor had knowledge that the costs for preparing the
proposals were not reimbursable if the deliver order was not awarded. There was no
indication that any of the contractors voiced concern over this practice.
There was no evidence found that might imply that the Government actions in this
area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily.

Shelf-life of one year
Used during end of fiscal year

Costs of proposal built into contract

Contained line item
Project
estimating
fee
Did not contain line item

Provided at no cost
/

Most
awarded

No complaint by
contractor

Provided at no cost
/

Most
awarded
Costs absorbed in total DO cost

No complaint by
contractor

Figure 4. Cross-case Analysis of Project Estimating Fees
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Cross-case Analysis of Balanced Work
Figure 5 identifies all of the data related to this area that was collected during the
seven case studies.
Five of the bases identified that the contractor experienced a surge in work during
the period of performance. Three of the cases involved concern by the Government and
contractor over these surges. Two of the bases, D and F, used a teaming arrangement to
spread periods of performance on the open delivery orders in an effort to alleviate the
situation resulting from the surge. The situation at Base B was not a result of 4' quarter
surge. Rather, the contractor was inundated with a large number of delivery orders. This
surge was to prepare for a major Air Force exercise. Furthermore, the contractor was
directly given priority requirements that were not known by the contracting officer.
While this situation was partially caused by the Government, there is no indication that
this type of problem existed at the other bases researched.
There was no evidence found that might imply that the Government actions in this
area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to perform satisfactorily.
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Negative impact

No concern

Teaming arrangement

Government concern

Contractor concern

Experienced surges

Did not experience surges

Few delivery orders

Figure 5. Cross-case Analysis of Equal Balancing of DOs Throughout Fiscal Year
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Cross-case Analysis of Inappropriate Use
Figure 6 identifies the data related to this area that was collected during the seven
case studies.
In only one case study, Base B, was there any indication that the Government
attempted to use SABER in an inappropriate manner. In this situation, the contracting
officer either returned the requirement to the customer for further action or forwarded the
requirement to the appropriate contracting element for procurement actions.
There was no evidence found throughout the case studies that might imply that
the Government actions in this area negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
perform satisfactorily.

Requirement forwarded to
appropriate contracting element

Requirement sent back to customer for
reconsideration

Attempted incidents of improper use
\

No incidents of attempted
improper use
/
No impact on the contractor

Figure 6. Cross-case Analysis of Inappropriate Use of the SABER Contract
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V. Results and Conclusions

Chapter V provides the results and conclusions of this research effort. In
addition, future research efforts are addressed.

Results
The objective of this research effort was to identify and analyze any conditions
that may have been created by the current SABER acquisition process that led to SABER
contractor failures. The specific research question addressed by this research was:
Are there any Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process
that are leading to contractor failure during the contract's period of performance?
In an effort to scope the research to a manageable level, five specific areas were
identified as potential problem areas. A subsidiary research question was created for
each area. These questions were:
(1) What was the Government's method of pricing the SABER contract? Did this
pricing method negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily
perform?
(2) What role, if applicable, did liquidated damages have during the performance
of the SABER contract? Did the assessment of liquidated damages, when
applied, negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on
existing and future SABER DOs?
(3) Does the Government reimburse the contractor for the cost of preparing a bid
for a project that is eventually not executed? If not, did this practice negatively
impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform on the contract?
(4) How does the Government balance the issuance of SABER delivery orders
over the course of the contract period? Were there any surges, particularly in the
fiscal year 4th quarter, which negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability
to satisfactorily perform?
(5) Was there any inappropriate use of the SABER contract? If so, did this
negatively impact the contractor's ability to satisfactorily perform?
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There were no significant findings in any of the five areas that would indicate the
Government's actions in those areas negatively impacted the SABER contractor's ability
to perform satisfactorily on the contract.

Conclusions
The research effort did not find conclusive evidence to support that the five
targeted Government-controlled factors of the SABER acquisition process led to
contractor failure during the contract's period of performance.

Follow-on Research
The research effort identified two areas for potential follow-on research. The first
area relates to the pricing of SABER delivery orders. The standard unit price book used
is the R.S. Means price book. R.S. Means updates their price book annually to reflect the
changing environment related to costs.
Of the seven bases researched, three bases awarded their contract to contractors
who bid negative coefficients. Each of these contracts failed.
In addition, the new SABER contractor at Base C has noted the price
discrepancies between the R.S. Means price book and the local area prices. That
contractor is working with a positive coefficient, but still claims they are working a
majority of the time at a loss.
A potential follow-on research effort could look into the accuracy of the R.S.
Means price book compared to local costs. Specific attention could focus on the rural
areas where some Air Force bases are found.
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A second follow-on effort could focus on the role small businesses have on
SABER contracts. Four of the seven bases researched involved an 8(a) set-aside. Of the
four, two failed during contract execution. Base E was in the process of re-procuring its
SABER contract without an 8(a) set-aside. However, this requires approval from various
Governmental agencies, including the Small Business Administration.
Many individuals expressed, during the interview process, their opinion that
SABER was not appropriate for a small business at their base. A follow-on effort could
focus on comparing the size of the Air Force base related to the size of the contractor,
large or small business. The research could then identify whether the SABER program
was successful at that base and determine whether there is a possible correlation between
the three areas.
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Appendix A: First Contact with Primary Point of Contact

Introduction
Captain Brian Heaps,
Primary duty Air Force Specialty Code is 64PX, Contracting Officer
Graduate student
Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Preliminary contact
SAF/AQCO is the co-sponsor of my thesis. The point of contact for SAF/AQCO
is Major Ed LaBenne. Major LaBenne made initial contact with each of you to
coordinate my site visit and gather data relating to my thesis effort.
About the research
Over the past 12 months, 15 SABER contracts have resulted in contract failures.
For the purpose of this research, contractor failure is defined by two outcomes. First, a
SABER contractor defaults on its contract during the performance period. Typically, the
contractor either goes out of business or decides to no longer perform work on the
existing contract. This results in the Government exercising its right to terminate the
contractor for default. The second failure outcome results from poor performance by the
contractor during the performance period. The poor performance leads to a Government
decision to not exercise an existing option on the SABER contract.
Research Objective
To identify and analyze any Government-controlled actions in the current
acquisition process that negatively impacts and contributes to the failure of contractors on
SABER contracts.

Five areas of the current SABER acquisition process have been identified as
potential problem areas and will be the focus of this research effort. They include:
(1) The Government's method of pricing SABER contracts (UPB, MEANS...).
(2) The Government's use of the liquidated damages clause in the SABER
contract.
(3) The Government's role in reimbursing the contractor for the cost of preparing
a bid for a project that eventually is not executed.
(4) The Government's role in balancing the issuance of SABER delivery orders
over the course of the contract period (4th quarter surge).
(5) The Government's inappropriate use of the SABER contract.
As a stipulation of allowing me to do so, I will send a complete write-up of my
visit to you for your review prior to publication.
What I'll Require
(1) The actual interview questionnaire will be included in Appendix B, which will
be electronically mailed to your organization.
(2) A copy of the acquisition plan, contract, and any related materials if the
contract was terminated or a contract option was not executed.
(3) Any other related materials pertinent to the site visit.
I expect to spend one day interviewing the points of contact followed by me
reading documents and reviewing my notes over the following four to six weeks. A
number of questions or areas of clarification may arise which will result in the need for
follow-up questions. This follow-up portion will be through the telephone or electronic
mail.
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Appendix B: Field Visit and Interview Guide

Purpose of the Research
To identify and analyze any Government-controlled actions in the current
acquisition process that negatively impacts and contributes to the failure of contractors on
SABER contracts.
Interview Questions
Background information (Pre-award):
Were there any protests during this period from SABER contract bidders?
1) Were the team members originally selected for the Government source
selection on the team throughout the entire source selection process?
2) What functional areas were included on the SABER source selection team?
3) What was the team members SABER experience?
4) Was the team co-located in one facility during the process or any portions of
the process?
5) Were the team members dedicated solely to the source selection process? If
not, approximately how much of their time was spent on the source selection
percentage-wise)?
6) Was an acquisition plan developed for the procurement?
7) Does the acquisition plan contain specific data relating to the overall
Government acquisition plan, its criteria for selection, and an acquisition
milestone chart?
8) Was the milestone chart met? What was the actual execution schedule?
9) Was a pre-proposal conference conducted prior to dissemination of the
Request for Proposal (RFP)? Who attended (contractors)?
10)

Were there any modifications to the RFP? What were they for?

11)

What was the minimum and maximum dollar amount listed on the RFP?
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(12)

How many bidders submitted proposals for the SABER contract?

(13) Was there an 8(a) set-aside for the SABER contract? If so, were any 8(a)
contractors selected?
(14) How many contractors were awarded the SABER contract? What
companies were awarded the SABER contract for the installation?
(15)

If applicable, did the incumbent contractor win any portion of the award?

(16)

What was the awarded amount on the SABER contract?

(17)

Was the SABER contract awarded without discussions?

(18) Were there any lessons learned identified during these phases of the
acquisition? What were they?
Background Information (post-award):
(1) How many years is the current SABER contract set up for?
(2) What period of performance is the SABER contract in?
(3) Were there any protests following contract award?
Have there been any modifications to the SABER contract? What were they for?
(4) Are SABER Contracting and SABER CE personnel co-located?
(5) Are there any lessons learned identified during these phases?
(6) If the contractor has failed or is in a situation leading to failure, what was/is
the justification for the termination or the Government's decision not to exercise
the option on the contract?
(7) With the elimination of the detailed Government Cost Estimate, how does CE
perform a technical evaluation and justify the methodology and costs proposed by
the contractor if it differs from the preliminary estimate submitted by the SABER
CE Project Manager?
(8) Are there any other issues not previously covered that could shed light on the
success/failure of the installation's SABER program? Was anything identified
after contract award that should have been included in the source selection
process?
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Specific Information
(1) How many Delivery Orders (DOs) were issued over the past 12 months?
What was the total amount awarded during this timeframe?
(2) How many DOs were issued over the final quarter of FYOO? What was the
total amount awarded during this timeframe? What work were they for?
(3) What is used to cost out SABER DOs (Unit Price Book, MEANS
database...)?
(4) With the elimination of the detailed Government Cost Estimate, how does the
Contracting Officer determine fair and reasonable on DOs?
(5) Does the SABER contract have a bid and proposal cost (where Government
pays the contractor for the cost of proposals if the work is not performed)? If
so, has this line item been used and when?
(6) Has the contractor accepted work above their maximum required amount as
identified in the SABER contract?
(7) Have any liquidated damages been assessed on any delivery orders? What
type of impact was experienced by the contractor (domino effect...)?
(8) Has there been any bonding issues identified over the performance of the
contract?
Method of Data Collection
A majority of the data will be collected during the site visit and interview process.
I expect to spend one full day for each site visit. The interview questions provided above
represent the minimum information relating to my research. Additional information will
be gathered on a case-by-case basis.
I will review documents relating to the above questions and request a copy of each
document for follow-up review.

85

For the validity and reliability of this research, I must address all of the above
questions. However, discussions will be allowed to take their natural course according to
the availability of respondents, information, and documentation.
Follow-up
It will likely be necessary for me to conduct follow-up calls to clarify and verify
information during the data analysis process. It is my intention to use the telephone and
electronic mail to conduct my follow-up efforts.
To ensure accuracy on the part of the researcher, once the case study is written, it will be
sent to the respondents for review prior to publication.
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